| How NOT to Build a Security Program |
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Andy Willingham (Andy ITGuy, @andywillingham) had a post up early this week titled "Building a security program from the ground up". It's an interesting read, though a bit on the naive side. Having just come out of an environment where my role was to build a security program from the ground up, I have a little bit of insight into this challenge. Despite my own failure and eventual inexplicable job loss, there is still much to learn, and much that I can add to this discussion. Of course, it wouldn't be right to talk about this topic without first acknowledging one of my major biases; that is, my strong preference toward the model I developed specifically toward how to structure an information assurance program (see my earlier posts on a separate blog: "Do You Need a Security Department?" and the slightly older "My Philosophy of Security"). Below is a snapshot of the TEAM Model, which I'll most likely mention in my responses.
With that said, let me tackle some Andy's comments and my gripe with them. Please note that I am working from the assumption of "building a security program from the ground up" and all that this implies (such as that there isn't already a program in place). Quote 1: "Here are a couple of assumptions: They already have a firewall and host based security suite installed and up to date. Beyond that, it’s a crap shoot." Comment: These are rather unfortunate assumptions. What is meant by "host based security suite"? AV? Something else? If you're coming into an existing organization to build a security program from the ground up, then you shouldn't come in with any assumptions. I've been in more than one organization that hasn't had a firewall, let along ANY host-based security (no AV, no HIDS, no logging, no monitoring, etc). Assumptions—especially bad assumptions—can be very bad things (see what a certain analyst says on this topic). If you're going to assume anything going into a new "green field" opportunity like this, it should be that nothing exists, nothing is being done, and that you will be met with inordinate amounts of resistance and organizational inertia. You should assume that you will have been given the "happy" story during the interview process, and that reality is far more stark. You should also assume that, despite the lip service paid in the interviews, there will be no way to know the commitment of executive management until you are actually onboard and asking them to put some skin in the game. Quote 2: "If I were coming into a company and had a free hand to do what I wanted I would first look at what I could do to get the biggest bang for my buck quickly and then focus on the long-term strategic planning." Comment: Here we have another bad implicit assumption. There's no such thing as having a "free hand to do what I wanted" in an existing organization. To think otherwise is to be somewhat deluded. The reality is that the business existed before you got there, and it's likely to exist without you being there in the future, or so they'll all be thinking in the back of their minds. In the comments of Andy's post Kevin Riggins makes the excellent observation that one of the first things you're going to need to do is go back to executive management AFTER the interview (and after you've started, presumably) to truly test their commitment and support. Without it, your life will be much more difficult. If you're thinking "not true, you can always do bottom-up", then sure, that's ok for certain operational concerns, but don't you dare bring up strategy or risk. :) Quote 3: "I’d say the first thing I’d do is implement a monitoring system so I can have some insight into what is going on." Comment: This comment isn't wrong, per se, it just fast-forwards through a number of steps. Monitor what? Logs? IDS? Firewall logs? Do you have a log server? Are you talking about *shudder* a SIEM solution? At the same time, what about policies and practices? So you're monitoring and seeing bad things... then what? Do you have the policies and executive support necessary to actually do something when you start seeing badness (and it definitely is when and not if). Your goal from the outset should be to quickly assess the state of the environment and start architecting a path to a defensible and recoverable posture (see my posts "Defensibility and Recoverability" and "Surviving in Degraded Conditions: A Human Analogy" for more on what this means). Note that I say "quickly assess". Depending on the size of the organization, this could be done fairly quickly. Walk through a facility or two, talk to as many people as people, from execs to tech to the manager in between, and then start building that roadmap. More important that anything here is that you need to learn what is critical to the business. If X blows up, then Y really bad consequence will occur. That sort of thing. Also, note here that I'm not even talking about "risk" at all. Forget about risk for a moment and just think about basic prioritization. It very simply comes down to a) identifying what's critical to the business, b) defending what's critical to the business, and c) building contingency plans for adequate recovery of what's critical to the business when something bad happens. Quote 4: "Once that was in place I’d probably implement a Vulnerability Management program that starts with Application and OS patching and then focus on the scanning, testing, exploiting etc..." Comment: I have to be honest, my jaw dropped a bit when I read this one. That's quite the leap in logic. Don't get me wrong, patching is very important, but the way he says it here, almost nonchalantly, gives one the false impression that this is somehow easy or trivial. There is, in fact, so much more that needs to be done than simply going out and implementing such a program. Change management, configuration management, access control and management, etc. Sure, none of these are mandatory for patching, but they absolutely have ties into a Vulnerability Management program. As for scanning, testing, and exploiting... well, let's just say that this is somewhat jumping the gun, and an area where one needs to be very cautious, too. Specifically, as you shift from the "push and pray" patch model to a formal Vulnerability Management program, don't forget that you are going to need to know what changes are being in your environment, when they're going in, what they're doing (impact), who made the change, and who authorized them, among other things. Yes, get the patching going (if it's not already), but hold off on the Vulnerability Management project until you have a better handle on processes. After the last quote, Andy talks about awareness training, governance, and policies and procedures all being run in parallel as much as possible. Gack. He talks earlier about long-term strategic planning, which is good in theory, but in practice not so much. He ends with "This is just a starting point." Fair enough, but the approach is far too technical without really knowing or understanding anything about the business, the environment, and - far more importantly - the people. Allow me to offer some alternative advice:
It would be easy to go on and on and on here, but I think the main points are covered. Certainly, there are other ways to tackle this challenge, but the above represents a significant chunk of what I learned in my seven months facing such a challenge.
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